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Title: The Polis of ‘Global’ Protest: Policing Protest at the G8 in Scotland 
 
Abstract: Protests at recent international summit meetings have prompted assertions 
about ‘global protest’ and ‘global civil society’. In this paper we provide a detailed 
and contextualised analysis of the 2005 G8 summit in Scotland focussing on the 
dynamic interplay between police and protestors. We argue that local variables were 
critical to the experience of this manifestation of ‘global protest’. Focusing on the 
policing of events in Edinburgh we highlight the pre-conceptions and assumptions 
(frames) underpinning police operations and contribute to more interactive 
understanding of police/protestor relations. Protest emerges in relation to the ‘polis’ 
(simultaneously denoting both the political community and the police), and neglecting 
this relationship leads to incomplete analyses. In concluding we consider the 
implications of our research for the policing of political protest.  
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The Polis of ‘Global’ Protest: Policing Protest at the G8 in Scotland 
 
Introduction 
In July 2004, the G8 group of world leaders announced that it would hold its next 
meeting in the Gleneagles Hotel, Scotland. Immediately, ‘there was an outpouring of 
you know: Genoa, Evian, Seattle’ (White, interview1). G8 summits have become so 
synonymous with violent clashes between police and protestors (in the media 
imagination at least) that the mere listing of previous venues was sufficient to raise 
the spectre of disorder. Genoa and Seattle in particular have become bywords for 
violent clashes, and the Scottish and British press reprised all the horror stories 
(complete with pictures) in the build up to the meeting in 2005.2 
 
Such stories assumed particular prominence because Scotland’s police forces have 
little history in dealing with mass public disorder. In terms of political protests: 
 
‘Not much has happened here … just the odd bits and pieces which everyone 
thoroughly enjoyed and no-one got hurt. The G8, however, is of a very different 
magnitude. For a start we are talking about 10,500 cops coming up [from 
throughout Britain]’ (Ross, interview).  
 
Such interviews unsettled our intended research focus on global protest and 
broadened the scope of our enquiry to encompass the social context within which 
protests are played out. Della Porta & Fillieule (2004: 217) highlight the mutually 
constitutive interplay between policing and protest and argue that policing is a critical 
factor in social movement action. Crucially the police should not simply be read as an 
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extension of the state, but must be comprehended as actors with their own attitudes 
and perspectives.  
 
Framing, in social movement literature, refers to the meaning-making work of 
activists and opponents and highlights the interactive processes through which events, 
people or situations are interpreted (Snow 2004: 384). Frames highlight specific 
aspects and provide actors with narratives that make sense of a situation and 
constitute action orientations (Snow 2004: 384-6). They may be mapped onto power 
asymmetries, and Drury et al. (2003) show how police frames which cast an entire 
crowd as hostile can obscure internal differences and, when acted upon, become self-
fulfilling. Our research shows how protest policing was framed by narratives relating 
to the (il)legitimacy of the various protestors which influenced subsequent 
interactions between police and protestors.  
 
The run up to the G8 summit saw some emphasis given to a Scottish approach to 
policing. Whilst the actual existence of this was contested by interviewees, the phrase 
highlights the significance of locality. We recently (Gorringe & Rosie 2006) argued 
that the activists protesting at the 2005 summit were embedded in a ‘national’3 
context influencing not only who attended demonstrations but also their modes of 
organisation and mobilisation. Here, in emphasising police (‘polis’ in colloquial 
Scots) actions and perspectives we hope to provide a more complex account of the 
way in which (global) activism is mediated in and through specific places, social 
relations and political structures. We offer a corrective to romanticised and sweeping 
accounts of the global justice movement which assume the presence of a global civil 
society and gloss over localised interactions, and contribute to the growing number of 
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ethnographic accounts charting the interplay between protest and policing (e.g. 
Sheptycki 2005; Ellison & Martin 1999; Della Porta 1998). 
 
The paper draws on research conducted before, during and immediately after the 
Gleneagles summit. We interviewed strategically placed police officers and protest 
participants, conducted conversations with dozens of protestors, collected a ‘snapshot’ 
survey of the largest demonstration, and undertook a review of newspaper coverage. 
This data is complemented by participant observation at key protest sites and events 
in early July 2005. Whilst in no sense comprehensive, our combination of methods 
offers a basis on which to consider the interplay between police and protestors in 
shaping the course of G8 protests. 
 
Global Protests? 
Hubbard & Miller posit the existence of a ‘truly global struggle’ against neo-
liberalism, noting that G8 summits ‘cannot now take place without the presence of 
demonstrators’ (2005: 230). Whilst some (e.g. Mayo, 2005) link this to the emergence 
of ‘global civil society’, others are more cautious. Diani (2005: 65) insists that ‘the 
embeddedness of actions conducted on global issues … is strongly mediated by the 
features of local civil societies and political systems’. Our research corroborates this 
analysis in that the 2005 protests followed a ‘national’ as much, if not more, than a 
‘global’ logic (Gorringe & Rosie 2006).  
 
The upshot was that 225,000 people marched through Edinburgh without a single 
arrest. The predominance of NGO and Church groups on the march had a bearing on 
the experience, and this constituency was no accident. Make Poverty History (MPH) 
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was a meticulously planned ‘set piece’, carefully coordinated with the police and 
deliberately distancing itself from previous summit protests (Dickinson, interview). 
Ideological commitment to a ‘diversity of tactics’ (including violence), which 
characterised past confrontations (Juris 2005), was actively discouraged and alternate 
forms of political expression were marginalised.  
 
Much of the protest impact in Seattle, Genoa, Cancun and Davos stemmed from the 
accommodation of a variety of activists, causes and methods. In freezing out radical 
voices, MPH focused attention on certain issues but contributed to a de-legitimisation 
of anti-systemic protest. Shunned by MPH (and dismissive of its rationale), radical 
actors organised alternative protests. The disparate strands of the loosely aligned 
‘Global Justice’ movement were, thus, sequestered into separate spheres - rendering 
the Gleneagles summit an ideal setting for the analysis of protest policing. Studying 
variations in policing over the course of a specific protest ‘moment’ (Earl & Soule 
2006: 146) illuminates the embeddedness of protest politics and the significance of 
specific police frames. 
 
Earl & Soule (2006) have recently outlined a ‘police-centred explanation of protest 
policing’. They examine how institutional and organisational characteristics of police 
agencies affect police attitudes towards situational protest dynamics. Countering the 
argument that threats to political elites predict repressive policing, they emphasise 
police fear of ‘losing control’. They (2006: 150) argue that missile throwing and 
protest size are most likely to trigger a police response when perceived as ‘cues 
signalling losses of control’. Whilst their argument echoes Waddington (1998), 
‘situational dynamics’ are not objective. Rather, they filter through pre-conceived 
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police understandings (or frames) pertaining to the protestors and the scope for 
trouble. Police, thus, do not ‘see blue’ in every context. Whilst Earl and Soule note 
the importance of organisational differences, we would follow Della Porta and Reiter 
(1998) in stressing cultural and attitudinal variations. 
 
McDonald (2006) cites ‘action and experience’ as the hallmarks of contemporary 
‘global movements’, identifying cultural factors which explain differences between 
US and British activist identities and campaign objectives. There is, however, a 
striking absence of conflict or political authority in his analysis (which is relevant 
only to democratic regimes). Where repression is the dominant motif of police 
authority, activists can be denied the recognition and reciprocity required for a 
collective identity to emerge or for action to be sustained (Sheptycki 2005: 345; 
Ellison & Martin 2000: 690). There are no index entries for ‘policing’ in McDonald’s 
book though, as Della Porta & Fillieule (2004) point out, even law-abiding protests 
disrupt routines and highlight the issue of policing. Policing cannot simply be equated 
with repression since police may also facilitate and/or channel protest (Earl 2003; 
Della Porta & Reiter 1998). 
 
Gillham & Marx (2000: 212) note that protests encompass a ‘significant degree of 
indeterminacy and tradeoffs’ by protestors and police. Their study of protests in 
Seattle highlights a multitude of factors – police training and attitudes, the legal 
context, media presence - which affect how a global protest event unfolds. Given that 
the police are key intermediaries and that the style and form of policing impacts on 
protest, any study of protest events must be contextualised within specific socio-
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political relations and must incorporate an analysis of the frames adopted by police as 
well as protestors.  
 
Whilst Della Porta & Reiter (1998: 5-6) observe a ‘progressive assimilation of 
policing styles’, the residual traces of distinct ‘national’ models and the variability of 
responses means that policing is never uniform. Despite such cautions there is a 
tendency for analysts to be insufficiently attuned to local specificities and adopt a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to policing. Della Porta & Fillieule’s (2004) account of 
‘British’ policing, thus, obscures internal differentiation such as the suggestion of a 
distinctly ‘Scottish’ approach. Reicher et al. (2004) emphasise the need for nuanced 
understandings in charting police authorities’ differential understandings of 
protestors. Discussing changing understandings of crowd psychology in police ranks, 
they emphasise the need to dispel the dangerous conflation of a ‘single mass of 
people’ with a ‘single psychological crowd’. This reference to police attitudes and 
assumptions raises the critically important variable of ‘police knowledge’. 
 
Della Porta & Reiter (1998) argue that abstract police approaches are filtered through 
specific police cultures and forms of knowledge which frame protest events. Police 
knowledge refers to the way that police understand both their role and the situation 
they confront, and draws on police culture, the set of assumptions shared by officers 
(ibid. 22; Della Porta 1998: 229). Officers intervene on ‘the basis of their 
understanding of the situation’ rather than through blind adherence to regulations and 
police knowledge thus mediates protest encounters (Della Porta & Reiter 1998: 22-3). 
Whilst Marx (1998: 259) argues that increasingly sophisticated intelligence enables 
police to be more discriminatory and selective - ‘rather than stereotyping all 
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demonstrators … they can be focused on those groups thought most likely to behave 
violently’ - such discretionary power means that certain groups may be branded as 
illegitimate ‘troublemakers’. Subsequently, regardless of how protestors perceive 
themselves, police authorities may develop ‘short-hands’ about categories of people 
and their behaviour.  
 
Della Porta & Fillieule (2004: 226) note that police stereotypes commonly include a 
threefold division of activists into ‘genuine’ protestors; ‘troublemakers’; and the ‘rent-
a-mob’. This directly affects the style of policing encountered and the forms of protest 
tolerated. The question is: how are such categorisations formulated, and are they 
widely diffused? Whilst recent studies suggest that Western democracies increasingly 
adopt ‘negotiated management’ styles of protest policing (Della Porta & Reiter 1998), 
O’Neill (2004: 245) notes the persistence of national policing styles. This paper 
considers both the diffusion of policing strategies and the impact of sub-state police 
frames on one particular manifestation of ‘global protest’. We begin by charting 
senior officers’ strategic objectives and orientations, before analysing the underlying 
assumptions that framed the interplay between police, protestors and media during 
three demonstrations in Edinburgh prior to the Gleneagles summit. In conclusion we 
reflect on the data and draw out the implications. 
 
‘Polis’-ing Global Protest? 
Interviews with senior police officers in Scotland made it clear that their self-image 
and professional culture assumed the persistence of national styles and that sub-state 
(Scottish) features informed local policing. The relative restraint of police forces in 
Britain (and particularly Scotland) compared to continental Europe was a recurrent 
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theme. ‘In Europe, I’m sure you’re well aware, you know, it’s confrontation, big 
sticks’ (White, interview): 
 
The alternative is the way they do it on the Continent … You line the police on 
the road, the Bürgermeister has the authority to say ‘this is the line’. And on that 
line they put up enormous steel barricades ... And if public come over that 
barricade, they are met with overwhelming force from the police, with tear gas, 
water canon, rubber bullets the lot … We deal with it differently (Dickinson, 
interview). 
 
These interviews reinforced distinctions between militarised gendarmerie and the 
‘community bobbies’ characteristic of Britain (Della Porta & Reiter 1998). When 
pressed on ‘Scottish policing’, however, it became clear that this was understood as a 
variant of a democratic ethos emphasising ‘facilitation of peaceful protest’. Each of 
our interviewees stressed the need for communication and de-escalation. 
 
Problems can escalate when they are not dealt with at a tactical level. Let’s 
suppose an operational officer gets a custard pie in the face from some clown 
and, quite understandably, drags him over the barrier and a ‘thing’ goes off. 
Someone [a senior officer] on CCTV sees what’s happening. Saying ‘get a PSU 
[Police Support Unit] in there quick’ is the wrong answer. Get him out of there. 
An officer’s been pied by an eejit [idiot] and is boiling about it – get him out of 
there cool him down (Ross, interview) 
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In terms of the G8 protest held in Auchterarder (close to the Gleneagles Hotel), Chief 
Constable Vine stressed that: ‘My officers were under instruction, strict instruction, 
that we wanted a pleasant, carnival atmosphere’. He highlighted three operational 
priorities: 
 
Firstly, don’t exacerbate a situation where none occurs. Officers should be able 
to take a bit of ribbing and teasing and so on. Secondly, if we immediately resort 
to arrests and so on, then we are faced with a logistical problem ... Thirdly, we 
wanted to facilitate protest. It is good for mainstream politics to enter into 
dialogue and facilitate people in expressing their views (Vine, interview). 
 
Our police respondents attributed their understandings of crowd behaviour to 
experience: ‘The police are not narrow-minded – they instinctively know how to deal 
with people. OK, they may not have studied issues or have a detailed analysis. 
Academics study, but cops experience’ (Ross, interview. See also Della Porta & 
Reiter 1998: 27). We heard numerous statements about, and examples of, 
accommodation of protest objectives and to this extent G8 policing in 2005 reflects 
broader trends toward negotiated management (cf. Waddington & King 2005, Reicher 




The main G8 related protest in 2005 was the Make Poverty History (MPH) march in 
Edinburgh. MPH was both the largest, and the first, demonstration that week, taking 
place on the Saturday before the summit. Thus, it promised to ‘set the scene’ for 
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subsequent protests. Well before the march, however, outlines of the action to come 
could be discerned: categorisation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protestors had begun, and the 
likely modes of intervention had been mapped out. In the following account we focus 
upon three consecutive protests in Edinburgh: the massive MPH march on Saturday 
(2nd July 2005); a more modest ‘Stop the War’ march on Sunday; and the more radical 
and ‘anarchist’ Carnival for Full Enjoyment on Monday. 
 
In relation to MPH, officers spoke of the police role as extending beyond crowd 
control to ‘crowd management’ and ‘welfare’, the event requiring management and 
facilitation rather than control. Significant trouble was not expected: ‘If anything 
happens [that weekend] it will likely be after the Stop the War (STW)4 rally’(Ross, 
interview). Even here, however, it was anticipated that trouble might be no more than 
‘a couple of drunken brawls’ (Ross, interview). Already, though, we see how police 
knowledge acts as an intervening variable between the principles and practice of 
‘negotiated management’. A key differentiating aspect between the two events – both 
were marches along a negotiated route, ending with a rally at an agreed location – was 
the police view: ‘... we’ve [Lothian & Borders Police (LBP)] got an history in 
Edinburgh of Stop the War coalition not doing what they had agreed to do, acting in 
an inappropriate way, not being trusted’ (Dickinson, interview). 
 
In 2003 anti-war demonstrators disrupted traffic over three days of spontaneous 
activism in Edinburgh that saw route plans discarded, roads blocked and police 
stations picketed. STW deviated from the consensus-based mode of politics 
dominating protest in Scotland, buoyed, in large part, by the significant presence of 
school-age activists.5 Within these modestly expanded parameters of protest, the 
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established repertoire served as a constraint (cf. Tilly 1986: 390), and activists 
remained peaceful and negotiated with police authorities. Nevertheless, the deviation 
from prevailing norms ensured that STW were classified as ‘troublemakers’ in 2005. 
Della Porta & Reiter (2005: 21) note how ‘defeat’ can lead the police to make tactical 
and structural changes. A pre-history of political engagement pre-disposed police to 
adopt differing particular perspectives and to act in particular ways in relation to 
certain protest constituencies in 2005. 
 
Such differences in policing were not lost on the protestors. As a leading Edinburgh 
activist told us: ‘I mean to be honest with you the policing on the Saturday [MPH] and 
the Monday [The ‘carnival’] was as much of a contrast as I think you’ll ever see’ 
(Fox, interview). Part of the reason behind this, as one officer explained, was that ‘we 
didn’t have the same trust in planning with them [other protestors] as we had with 
Make Poverty History, who were excellent’ (Dickinson, interview). Far from an 
undifferentiated and uniform confrontation with ‘the state’, it is clear that the various 
G8 protests were negotiated on the ground in interactions between a discretionary 
police force and diverse protest groups.  
 
Global protest, thus, is mediated through locally specific police/protestor relations. 
This is further reinforced by the fact that the media remain ‘national’ (rather than 
global) in scope. Media representations are not uniform, and influence the atmosphere 
within which protest events occur. Juris, for example, notes the starkly divergent 
responses of Italian and Spanish media to the Genoa summit protests. ‘The media did 
not just report on the space of terror in Genoa, they helped produce it’ (2005: 426). In 
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the context of sensationalist predictions of disorder in the Scottish and British press, 
there were fears that these could become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
 
In the run up to MPH many newspapers voiced fears about ‘baying mobs’, ‘bedlam’ 
and ‘riots’ (Gorringe & Rosie 2006). ‘Anarchists’, primarily associated with protest 
events on Monday, also featured prominently as ‘militants’ who – it was feared – 
would ‘hijack’ other demonstrations. In the asymmetry of representations, media are 
powerful actors and not only produce ‘the space of terror’, but provide frames that 
make sense of events. Altheide (1997: 648) notes the ubiquity of a ‘problem frame’ 
which promotes fear. ‘Anarchists’, in much of the press, were routinely framed in 
terms designed to inculcate fear. Police preparations displayed an acute awareness of 
this and employed newsletters, websites and press conferences to correct misleading 
information. In Auchterarder a dedicated full-time officer was installed a year before 
the summit as ‘a G8 community spokesman … to liaise with locals and alleviate their 
fears’ (White, interview). A key rationale for this posting was to combat the effect of 
sensationalist media accounts amongst local people:  
 
I knew that the press would resort to outlandish claims if not pure invention and 
people would get more and more scared in response to the scare stories. So [the 
officer] was on hand to deal with people’s concerns (Vine, interview). 
 
Police were determined to keep Auchterarder and Edinburgh ‘open’ and deprecated 
alarmism about protest violence. Auchterarder’s liaison officer told us that:  
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Some are saying they are not going to do that much business this month and so 
they are going to board up and go away. Those in involved in the retail 
business are not best served by that. From my point of view I think it’s quite 
sad, that somebody wants to board up (White, interview).  
 
The police themselves, of course, are not immune to sensationalist reporting and 
media accounts colour their preconceptions and attitudes: ‘Cops read papers too’ 
(Ross, interview). Officers were convinced that some protestors were out to cause 
trouble: their fear was that exaggerated predictions of violence and disorder would 
attract a certain type of protestor. Alongside the ‘genuine’ protestors and the 
‘troublemakers’, officers (echoing Della Porta & Fillieule’s threefold categorisation) 
were ‘leisure protestors, there for a ruck [confrontation]’ (Ross, interview). 
 
Many of the preconceptions that we encountered in police interviews centred around 
the concept of legitimacy (cf. Della Porta & Reiter 1998). Asked whether he would 
draw any distinction ‘between legitimate protestors who use the [established] 
channels, and others, non-legitimate, who don’t’, Tayside’s Chief Constable was 
emphatic: ‘Oh Yes!’ (Vine, interview). He insisted that efforts to establish contact 
with such actors were rebuffed. The upshot was a differentiation between the ‘good’ 
(consensual) campaigners; more radical – but basically law-abiding – protestors [such 
as G8 Alternatives, ‘managed by people … who know what they are doing’ (Ross, 
interview)]; and the ‘anarchist’ fringe: ‘Criminal Tourists I’ve called them, it is a nice 
phrase that captures much of what they are about’ (Vine, interview). The illegitimacy 
of certain protestors was firmly established prior to the actual summit: 
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The Make Poverty History lot are largely a peaceful group. They have largely 
achieved their objectives already, because that’s what everyone is talking about. 
It’s on the agenda. Globalisation ... well people are talking about climate change 
which they say they are interested in. But anarchist groups, they are just there 
for a ruck (Ross, interview). 
 
Whilst Marx (1998) argues that targeting ‘likely troublemakers’ permits a more open 
and facilitative approach to ‘legitimate protest’, such broad-brush characterisations 
can translate into action-orientations. In sum, well before G8 protestors mobilised, 
police ‘knew’ who they were and how to deal with them. This knowledge fed off the 
media circus attending each global protest event, but was more immediately fostered 
by local media, police culture and police/protestor interactions. Next, we consider the 
extent to which these pre-established frames influenced protest policing. 
 
Route Marches 
Each day between the 2nd and 7th July 2005, saw protests across central Scotland, 
from the events in Edinburgh, through ‘blockades’ of the Faslane submarine base and 
Dungavel asylum centre, to an activist ‘eco-camp’ in Stirling, and a concluding 
protest in Auchterarder. The number and spread of events meant that we could not 
attend every one. We focus, therefore, on three key events in Edinburgh that we both 
witnessed directly.  
 
The MPH march was remarkable for the massive turnout and for the disparity 
between prior fears articulated in the media and the actual event (Gorringe & Rosie 
2006). Policing on the day was friendly and relaxed, confirming what our police 
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informants had predicted: ‘All people will see is Scottish polis in flat caps and yellae 
jackets. All very nicey-nicey, very friendly – “this way to the toilets madam” -style of 
policing’ (Ross, interview). MPH’s objectives, organisation and demographic 
rendered this unsurprising. The family-oriented approach allied to a predominance of 
NGO and Church groups meant this was as consensual as protest can be and was 
facilitated as such. Indeed, the LBP website carried a message of welcome to MPH 
participants from the Lord Provost and Chief Constable of Edinburgh.6 The efforts 
made in Edinburgh to enable MPH participants to circle the city-centre (re-directing 
traffic, blocking roads, erecting signposts, etc.) reflected prior assumptions about the 
legitimacy of the occasion. Significantly, we contend that existing police frames 
affected not only the experience but also the interpretation of MPH. 
 
In the congratulatory media coverage of MPH, many accounts gave some space to an 
altercation between a group of around 60 ‘Black Blok’ anarchists and the police. The 
group – including many European activists - were identified on the fringes of the 
march, corralled in a side street, and cordoned off for over an hour: 
 
Those who were surrounded were very apprehensive, because being cordoned 
off abroad is usually a precursor to the police wading in, laying about with 
batons and making arrests. Whereas it was never our intention to even arrest 
them at that point. They were expecting a much heavier response (Vine, 
interview).  
 
LBP confirmed that ‘serious confrontations’ on the outskirts of the march could have 
resulted in arrests but the police did not want to tarnish the general mood of the day 
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(Dickinson, interview). Had LBP opted to emphasise disorder, clamp down on 
‘misbehaviour’ and make arrests then media coverage and public opinion might have 
been swayed and Edinburgh could now feature – to some degree - alongside Genoa, 
Seattle and other bywords for ‘violent’ Global protest. Instead, the group was 
gradually released, photographers were denied easy access to the situation, and the 
dominant motif of the march remained peaceful bonhomie. These interactions bring 
police/protestor relations to the fore and introduce local specificities into the analysis 
of protest policing. Had such an event occurred during other G8 protests the response 
is likely to have been more robust. 
 
The following day, the unexpectedly small size of the pre-arranged and sanctioned 
STW rally (approximately 4,000) did not initially entail a proportionate reduction in 
policing. There seemed to be a much more tangible (and stern-faced) police presence. 
As the march proceeded without incident, however, there was a marked diminution in 
police: 
 
The police seemed to revert to the softly-softly approach, and by the time we 
reached Calton Hill [end point of the march] some were actually smiling and 
joking with the marchers. By the time the rally was underway I realised that the 
police had completely withdrawn - I couldn’t see any cops at all (Rosie, 
fieldnotes).  
 
LBP later told us that : 
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Sunday [STW] was different from Saturday [MPH] only in that on Saturday I 
was policing for 120 [thousand] and I got 225, on Sunday I forget the numbers, 
but I think I was policing for something like 25 [thousand] and I got 5. So the 
ratio of police to demonstrators on Sunday was rather different, and the police 
were more obvious. Just because of the numbers (Dickinson, interview). 
 
Whilst this explanation rings true, that our respondent immediately thereafter raised 
the issue of trust accords perfectly with the fact that STW have ‘a history’ in 
Edinburgh, and (in LBP’s eyes) are not entirely trustworthy. Police melted away only 
when STW showed no signs of the spontaneity of the 2003 protests. The initial police 
presence, in this light, was also intended to deter any deviation from the prearranged 
route. Indeed, later in the same interview, we were told that: 
 
Putting the officers out in full protective equipment is a non-verbal signal to say 
there are some rules out here, and some things you can get away with, but there 
is a rule here, and the rule is this line of police officers will not let you pass 
(Dickinson, interview). 
   
Such non-verbal signals were conspicuously absent during MPH, but sterner tests of 
policing lay ahead. MPH and STW are coalitions cohering around mainstream (albeit 
contentious) issues. ‘Poverty’ and ‘War’ are uniformly accepted as undesirable and a 
broad spectrum of social opinion is aligned behind each campaign. On Monday 4th 
July, however, the ‘Carnival of Full Enjoyment’ promised to ‘make capitalism 
history’ and engage in anti-systemic protests. Monday brought police face-to-face 
with those commonly described as ‘anarchists’ (which, in this context, stands as a 
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proxy for radical or even violent protestors). Negative police perceptions of these 
groups, as noted above, cast them as ‘out for a ruck’, ‘illegitimate’ and ‘criminal’. 
This frame, we argue, helps explain policing on Monday.  
 
Containing the Carnival 
What was later dubbed the ‘Battle of Princes Street’ [Edinburgh’s main commercial 
thoroughfare] was billed simply as a ‘carnival’. Participants were urged to congregate 
at noon, but beyond that there was no preordained sequence of events. The absence of 
any clear focus and the diffusion of activists around the centre mean that it is difficult 
to construct a coherent account of what happened, but some flashpoints during the day 
offer an opportunity to assess the situation. Somewhere between 300 and 600 
protestors turned up at the allotted meeting place, but swiftly dissolved into separate 
blocks. One section headed towards the financial district and was very quickly 
blocked in on a minor street. Those caught up in the Canning Street cordon (including 
one of the authors) remained penned in for five hours. 
 
In its report into policing on a 2003 anti-war demonstration, the New York Civil 
Liberties Union urged police to abandon the practice of confining protestors within 
barricades. Such penning in of protestors means that they are unable to obtain food or 
water, go to the toilet or go home. When asked about potential erosion of civil 
liberties, our LBP respondent was frank: ‘The principle is that peoples’ personal 
liberty gets infringed because there is no alternative. The alternative is to allow 
anarchy to win and there will be no control in society’ (Dickinson, interview). Police 
and press reports noted the presence of black-clad and masked activists in the crowd, 
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but (after initial scuffles as protestors realised they were effectively corralled) there 
was no violence on the part of either demonstrators or police.  
 
From the perspective of protestors, however, events at Canning Street were confused 
and confusing. There was no communication from the police on when - or whether - 
protestors would be allowed to leave. Penning, as a tactic, operates according to a 
master-frame that views protestors as troublemakers, allowing little differentiation 
between individuals. Colin Fox, thus, termed the policing a ‘disgrace’ and spoke of 
constituents detained in Canning Street without water or facilities (Fox, interview). 
The circulation of such accounts, as Reicher et al (2004: 569-70) argue, may increase 
the ‘costs’ of containment by discrediting and de-legitimising police action.  
 
Section 60 (S60) of the Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994 - the control order 
imposed on central Edinburgh for the duration of the protests – was the basis for the 
pens. S60, as the legal advice section of activist website ‘Urban 75’ explains, ‘is a 
new police tactic at major demonstrations used effectively to control, subdue and gain 
personal information about protesters despite having the extraordinarily limited power 
simply to “Stop and search in anticipation of violence”’.7 This highly subjective 
‘anticipation of violence’ affords officers enormous discretionary leeway. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, inconsistencies in the use of S60 emerged. One of the 
authors was dealt with properly: the searching officer identified himself, his number 
and force before conducting a search for weapons. Two people accompanying the 
author, however, were not provided with background information, and were 
‘required’ to provide names and addresses, photographed and ‘cautioned’ not to 
protest in the near future. 
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Police discretion, of course, means that the conduct of officers may be subject to 
variation. ACC Dickinson was open about such discrepancies: ‘Inevitably in any unit 
you have people who are more confident or less confident, people who accepted their 
training and embraced it, and simply not bothered with it and couldn’t care less’ 
(Dickinson, interview). Police attitudes to the carnival, however, did not simply 
emerge through the muddled interpretation of a control order. At one end of Princes 
Street, protestors were prevented from spilling out onto an approach road by the 
mobile barricades of an ‘iron horse’ – ‘a trailer, holding out a metal barrier, which 
really works, it just seals an area off’ (Dickinson, interview). Hundreds of police in 
protective equipment blocked off each end of Princes Street to prevent a march from 
heading towards the retail chains. As a ‘non-verbal signal’ these precautions 
effectively de-legitimised the protests and resembled the strategy of ‘total control’ 
(Della Porta 1998: 250). 
 
A BBC report aptly described the ‘Carnival’ as ‘a day-long game of cat and mouse’ 
(Todd 2005). The protestors’ refusal to abide by the rules meant that confusion 
prevailed. Small bands of protestors clustered at junctions, confronted police and 
inverted the symbolic order of the city. Most of these smaller events were good-
natured and dominated by protestors in colourful clothing, samba drums and clown 
outfits. Despite the unambiguous nature of the police presence it was clear that there 
was scope for discretion on the ground. Just beyond the ‘iron horse’, for instance, 
police looked on as 30 people occupied a key junction and danced to drums and 
whistles. Since traffic had already been diverted, the symbolic gesture of defiance was 
tolerated. At each protest site passers-by, activists and curious onlookers gathered. 
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Dotted through the crowds, however, were ‘masked individuals dressed in black who 
had clearly come to show a more aggressive face of anti-G8 protest’ (Todd 2005). 
Unsurprisingly, where such individuals were clustered the police presence was 
heaviest. An activist later wrote: ‘The right and ability to protest with passion and 
relative safety disappeared when … police aggression was met with the disruptive 
retaliatory actions of the masked marauders’ (Matheuse 2005: 13). 
 
This was the case on Princes Street where ‘peaceful demonstration turned into an ugly 
confrontation’ (Todd 2005). Mounted police and officers in riot gear were confronted 
by protestors – many dressed in black. As the stand-off became heated, hooded 
activists chanted of ‘polizia assassini’ (by reference to Genoa) and pressed forward. 
There was aggression but, initially, no violence. Throughout a two hour face-off 
protestors occupied the road abutting Jenners (Edinburgh’s ‘classiest’ store), Marks & 
Spencer and other retail outlets but made no attempt to attack them. The lack of a 
clear protest objective seemingly troubled police officers. Uncertain whether to hold 
the line or retreat there were periodic displays of aggression. At 2.45pm, for instance, 
as the chanting crowd pressed up against the police line, mounted officers drew 
batons and thrust forward, scattering protestors into Princes Street Gardens, but the 
horses were replaced by shield-bearing and helmeted police (Gorringe, fieldnotes). 
 
This mise-en-scene suggests adherence to the principle of de-escalation and indeed, 
Dickinson described the ‘gold standard’ of policing as resting on three key planks: 
make contact, ascertain protest objectives and set boundaries (interview). 
‘Confrontational policing rarely works’, he insisted, and pointed to ongoing attempts 
at communication during the ‘Carnival’: 
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It was very difficult because there was no allocated sort of spokesperson, but we 
did say ‘if you don’t get contact with the organisers, get contact with the 
protesters’. And when they assembled on the corner of Princes Street … that is 
what we did - go and talk to them: “What you are intending to do? What are you 
trying to? Where do you want to walk to? ... Etc etc” and help them to do it. 
Remember, what we actually ended up doing was a procession, with people 
playing music, lots of costumes, people with balloons around. ... It was only 
when it deteriorated, when people decided they’re not going to have a 
procession, they were going to do more difficult things, and eventually just 
started carrying out deliberate attacks, that the situation deteriorated (Dickinson, 
interview). 
 
In this frame, shared by junior officers, police attempts to accommodate protest were 
frustrated, a view. Heading home on the Monday evening one of the authors engaged 
police officers on Princes Street in conversation: 
 
- Was there really any need for all those riot police? 
Yes, definitely. We’re not prepared to stand there and take stuff … In any EU 
country there would have been a much more aggressive response (Gorringe, 
fieldnotes). 
 
Whilst the above accounts indict a few ‘dangerous’ activists, police expectations and 
reactions helped to shape specific protest response. For example, at 2pm a group of 50 
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demonstrators (mostly dressed as clowns) faced officers in protective equipment at a 
road junction.  
Suddenly the police turned, ran back to their vans, and left 50-100 rampant 
‘anarchists’ in possession of the field. Having briefly chased after the vans 
waving dusters and flags cheering and shouting: ‘we scared the police off’ - they 
dispersed and traipsed off looking for more action. (Gorringe fieldnotes). 
 
In this instance, and in others, the police presence was the demonstration. Without it, 
the protest and the confrontation evaporated. Reflecting on this scenario, Dickinson 
conceded that had police been withdrawn more generally: 
 
It could be there is no target. Equally members of the public might be scared out 
their wits, and the businesses on Princes Street could have been trashed. Which 
professional police officer is going take that risk? (Interview). 
 
‘Large-scale public protests’, O’Neill (2004: 245) notes, ‘are among the most volatile 
of situations authorities confront’. There are, however, a variety of possible responses 
and much of the policing that we witnessed could be interpreted as aggressive, 
overbearing and unimaginative. In attempting to clear some areas police aggressively 
shoved protestors and onlookers with their shields, shouting (and swearing) at them to 
get out of the way (Gorringe, fieldnotes). By early evening local youths had joined the 
fray, beer-cans and cobbles were thrown, and the police responded by treating those 
on the streets as an undifferentiated mob. Waddington (1998) and Earl & Soule 
(2006) note police concerns about order and Dickinson echoed these insisting: ‘the 
 24
actual fact is that there were two occasions on Monday when I almost lost control’ 
(Interview).  
 
The use of sophisticated communication strategies are one alternative means that 
could have been employed, as is the ‘non-verbal signal’ sent out by officers in ‘flat 
caps’. Unless and until such risks are taken, the prevalent motif of ‘anarchist’ protests 
will be confrontational despite police emphasis on ‘de-escalation’, confirming 
Waddington’s (1998: 139) scepticism about the trend towards more consensual modes 
of policing. Ambivalence towards the practice of de-escalation was dramatically 
emphasised in Canning Street when, despite a complete absence of provocation or 
confrontation, officers in everyday uniforms gave way to a line of helmeted and 
shield-bearing police (Rosie, fieldnotes). We were later told that what had been (quite 
understandably) interpreted by already-nervous protestors as a calculated aggressive 
signal was in fact no more than a shift-change of the officers.  
 
Underpinning the democratic approach to policing is communication, but this was 
markedly lacking during the ‘Carnival’. Reicher et al. (2004: 268) note that whilst: 
 
there exist large reserves of armoured vehicles, baton rounds and so on which 
are hardly ever used … communicative technologies [such as mobile LED 
screens or loudspeaker systems] which would probably prove useful in 
virtually every crowd event are virtually non-existent.  
 
This lack of communication extended to tourists, passers-by and shoppers, some of 
whom got caught up in the melee or found themselves locked into shops. The absence 
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of dialogue meant that the mutual antagonism of protestors and police briefly became 
violent. As police officers with batons moved in on the Gardens, benches, bins and 
flowers were uprooted and flung at the police. Dickinson insisted that ‘police officers 
have been seizing weapons - clubs with nails on them, razor bladed belts. We’ve got 
petrol bombs and acid bombs’ (interview). No such deadly weapons, thankfully, were 
in evidence on Princes Street. Indeed, some dismayed protestors sought to replant the 
flowers.  
 
Damage over the course of the ‘Carnival’ and its aftermath amounted to ‘two 
windows, 200 geraniums and several park benches’ (Dickinson, interview). ‘To those 
people who’ve seen like political protest, confrontations with the police’, Fox 
suggested, ‘… it was nothing. It was quite frankly an embarrassment to call it a riot’ 
(Fox, interview). Matheuse’s (2005: 12) impressionistic account of the day, dubbed it 
the ‘Carnival of Full Deployment’ and the title is apposite. Of the three protests 
discussed in this paper the ‘Carnival’ was by far the smallest in terms of numbers and 
yet provoked the most robust police response. Hundreds of officers, in full ‘riot’ gear 
were deployed to clear the streets of the city centre. 
 
Underlying the problematic dynamics of the Carnival was the thorny issue of anti-
systemic protest. How do you police by consensus if protestors deny your legitimacy,  
there is no one to talk to, no set plan? Arguably the variable policing over the three 
days boils down to the difference between a pre-arranged demonstration and the 
uncertainty of ‘spontaneous’ protest. We contend that a stock of stereotypes, 
assumptions and identities mediated each encounter, gave each camp a sense of 
‘knowing the other’ and imposed certainty on an uncertain situation. The rhetoric of 
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‘soft-hat’ policing papered over less nuanced analyses: ‘Just as people can feel 
anonymous in a crowd – the mob if you like, cops can feel anonymous too’ (Ross, 
interview). Implicit here are traces of ‘old-school’ crowd psychology in which the 
whole is seen as more than the sum of its parts and processes and identities 
underpinning crowd formation are sidelined. Official codes of practice, Waddington 
& King (2005: 501) note, are often observed more in the breach than the practice. 
Failing to question prevalent stereotypes and perceiving the ‘crowd’ as an 
homogenous - and volatile - actor make such breaches more probable. As one 
respondent opined: ‘The force could have done more internally in terms of education 
and managing people’s apprehensions’ (White, Interview). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The 2005 G8 demonstrations highlight the significance of police/protestor relations, 
and how policing is a key variable in ‘the instigation or escalation of disorder’ 
(Waddington & King 2005: 501). ‘Global protests’, thus, are mediated by local social, 
political and historical contexts such as the identities and frames that inform 
police/protestor encounters. The dynamics of one event cannot simply be ‘imported’ 
into another context. Rather, as we have argued, protests are subject to localised 
dynamics impacting upon their course, style and representation. G8 2005 (in 
Edinburgh at least) says as much - if not more - about Scottish (and British) policing, 
protest and police frames than about international summit protests. In conclusion, 
therefore, we consider the implications of our analysis at this local level. 
 
Whilst Scottish police forces are infused with the democratic ethos increasingly 
characteristic of ‘Western’ policing, this ethos is filtered through specific police 
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cultures and knowledge. Our findings fit with other research highlighting the 
asymmetry between police and protestor framings, and the significance of this in 
explaining the escalation of conflictual situations. Situational analysis must be 
complemented by attitudinal research. Localised interactions between police and 
protestors, for example, can create a ‘history’ that affects how police and protestors 
(re)act towards each other (cf. Della Porta & Reiter 1998: 20). Reicher et al (2004) 
stress the need to differentiate between actors in a crowd particularly at the point of 
confrontation, but whilst differentiation featured in police operations in Edinburgh, at 
key points on the Monday groups were treated as a dangerous collective partly 
because there was a preconception of ‘anarchists’ as troublemakers. Actions based on 
such perceptions not only prevented non-hostile elements from leaving, but arguably 
adversely affected in-crowd interactions (Reicher et al 2004, Waddington & King 
2005).  
 
Traditional attempts to communicate through mediators do not work for anti-systemic 
groups, who often depend on the police to provide a focus (Waddington 1998). 
Innovatory tactics or communication strategies, however, could have been deployed 
to diffuse tension and differentiate between those looking for a fight and ‘trapped’ 
onlookers. Well before the summit a prevalent policing frame stressed that:  
 
The first priority is obviously the security of those attending the summit and not 
next in line, but alongside that, we have to make sure that the local community 
are protected and I’m sorry, but the interests of the protestors have to come 
behind those two issues (White, interview). 
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Rather than viewing protestors as a ‘nuisance’ to be managed the above priorities 
should be understood as interlinked. Edinburgh 2005 did not resemble past summits, 
largely because of local variables. If aggression and distrust can become self-fulfilling 
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